On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation

Nikhil Pal Singh

Many of the black carpenters were freemen. Things seemed to be going on very well. All at once, the white carpenters knocked off, and said they would not work with free colored workmen. Their reason for this, as alleged, was, that if free colored carpenters were encouraged, they would soon take the trade into their own hands, and poor white men would be thrown out of employment. . . . My fellow apprentices very soon began to feel it degrading to them to work with me. They began to put on airs, and talk about the “niggers taking the country,” saying we all ought to be killed.

—Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life (1845)

When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system of exchange, of exchange values and of money, or which correspond to an undeveloped degree of these, then it is clear from the outset that the individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal, enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf etc. or as members of a caste etc. or as members of an estate etc. In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, the distinctions of blood, education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up; . . . and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indifference). . . . The defined-ness of individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves. . . . A closer examination of these external relations shows, however, . . . [that]
these external relations are very far from being an abolition of “relations of dependence”; they are merely the elaboration and emergence of the general foundation of the relations of personal dependence . . . in such a way that individuals are now ruled by abstractions. . . . The abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of those material relations which are their lord and master.
—Karl Marx, Grundrisse (1857) (italics added)

The fifth day after my arrival I put on the clothes of a common laborer and went upon the wharves in search of work. . . . I saw a large pile of coal . . . and asked the privilege of bringing in and putting away this coal. . . . I was not long in accomplishing the job, when the dear lady put into my hand two silver half dollars. To understand the emotion which swelled my heart as I clasped this money, realizing I had no master who could take it from me, that it was mine—that my hands were my own, and could earn more of the precious coin—one must have been himself in some sense a slave.
—Frederick Douglass, Notebooks (1881) (italics added)

In this essay I offer provisional thoughts about the links between human bondage and capitalist abstraction and the subsequent constitution of racial differentiation within capitalism. My concern is to complicate a tendency in radical thought influenced by Marx, but more specifically by the strand of Marxist theorizing sometimes defined under the heading of political Marxism. This tendency insists on a definition of capitalism premised on the structural separation of a productive regime of superior efficiency based on economic exploitation of wage labor from forms of extraeconomic coercion in support of modes of accumulation whose lineages are frequently ascribed to noncapitalist or precapitalist histories. This view, which despite its historicist bent can unfortunately converge with a modernization paradigm, is based on a strict single-country origin story of capitalist “takeoff,” defined by the establishment of a specific set of class and property relationships internal to the English countryside in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—relationships that inaugurated a radical market dependency that in turn motored a qualitative shift toward radically self-augmenting productivity and capital accumulation.

What is gained in analytical and historical precision by this important body of scholarly thinking is lost in theoretical scope and political capaciousness, as it tends toward a significant bracketing or relegation of contemporaneous modes of economic expansion, particularly slavery and the slave trade, whose links to the rise of industrial capitalism may be acknowledged as a component of the origin story but whose contribution to what we might call the form of capitalism remains radically underspecified. More problematic, it supports a tendency in Marxist thought to think of slavery as capitalism’s antecedent—a historical stage, which
glosses over a startling fact affirmed in much recent historiography that
the chattel slave was a new kind of laboring being and new species of prop-
erty born with capitalism.3 Slavery, as Sven Beckert writes, especially on
North America’s “cotton frontier,” was not only a labor regime but also
a means to allocate capital that was “tightly linked to the intensity and
profits of industrial capitalism” that gradually eschewed direct coercion
of producers.4 Marx’s oeuvre, which frequently compares the contempo-
raneous forms of work conducted by workers and slaves during this time,
exemplifies the problem we face, both offering support for what W. E. B.
Du Bois once called “slavery character” of capitalism, particularly in its
Anglo-American ascendancy, and yet contributing to a problematic con-
ceptual relegation of African slavery within capitalism’s history that has
haunted radical politics ever since.

The outstanding trace of that haunting is a political imagination
that separates race, sex, and gender domination from capitalist exploita-
tion both conceptually and in terms of strategic priorities of working-class
unification and struggle. Ironically, this way of understanding anticapita-
lalist struggle not only presents an impediment to the kind of solidarity
required in a world characterized by “intimate and plural relationships
to capital.”5 It also forfeits a powerful analytic discernible within Marx’s
oeuvre that conceives capitalism as a machine whose productive expan-
sion also rests upon expanding fields of appropriation and dispossession.6
Marx not only describes capitalism as “veiled slavery”; he also takes “slave
management in slave-trade countries” as a reference point and baseline for
thinking about capitalism’s seizure of vital life processes, including what
he describes as the wageworker’s “premature death.”7 As subsequent anti-
Marxist critics have pointed out, however, slavery in this register is para-
doxically both indispensable for thinking capitalism and “unthinkable”
as such: sometimes it seems “closer to capitalism’s primal desire . . . than
wage [labor],” while at other times it represents what has been superseded
by an order of oppression whose stealth (or veiled) power rests upon an
supposed ability to dispense with violent dominion.8

Strictly counterpoising or making categorical a distinction between
the worker’s exploitation and slave’s social death—a common move within
an important strand of contemporary black critical theorizing often
defined under the heading Afro-pessimism—offers no better answers
to this conundrum, merely a kind of inversion in which slavery and the
antiblackness that proceeds from it is the excluded ground of politics as
such. This approach further alienates an understanding of slavery tied to
the development of capitalism and with it any impulse to overcome the
problematic severing of racial domination and class subordination. To
the end of bridging this analytical and political divide, we might instead
begin by recognizing how the production of racial stigma that arises in
support of chattel slavery makes a specific and enduring contribution to developing what might be termed the material, ideological, and affective infrastructures of appropriation and dispossession that are indispensable to capitalism as a set of distinctive productive relationships.

The differential ethicopolitical valuation of human subjects in slavery derives from how slave status was explicitly raced, gendered, and sexed within a household ontology of rule via privatized violence formally backed by state power, even as wage labor (and even indentured servitude) was increasingly becoming nationalized and linked to a realm of public, social standing, and state protection. As historian Jennifer L. Morgan has recently observed, the main legal innovation of chattel slavery in seventeenth-century North America was to assign to it a hereditary force through the reproductive capacity of captive African women who could thereby only ever give birth to future slaves. Subtending the unpaid labor of slaves (like workers) was another layer of unpaid work: social and biological reproduction, conducted by women. The process of conception and reproduction under slavery, however, was violently coerced and attached to the creation of a new species of human capital, “sustained,” in the words of Frederick Douglass, “by the auctioneer’s block.” This biocapitalist innovation was in turn married to a concomitant elaboration of what might be termed a necrocapitalist prerogative, expanding the ambit and varieties of corporeal violence that could be visited upon the bodies of slaves without or with minimal legal sanction, up to and including homicide.

The rise of the commodity form, as Marx tells us, helped advance ideas of universal exchangeability, formal equality, general abstraction, and a human subject without particular properties. The legal-governmental procedures and material processes that produced these effects, however, operated in a context of human beings who were themselves commodities (as well as instruments of credit and capital investment), and on the grounds of communally articulated differences and divisions that were in turn regrounded, repositioned, and ultimately regrouped under separate bodies of abstract thinking, most notably racial science, whose lineage contaminated the development of the human sciences more generally. In this view, racial subordination might be thought of as something that materialized with the production/governance of normative class differentiation—a kind of superordinate class inequality structured into (certain variants of) capitalist social formation through an association of whiteness with property, citizenship, wages, and credit, along with the renewal of surplus and/or superexploited subjectivities and collectivities at the openly coercive, lawless/law-defining edge of capitalist accumulation by dispossession.

This is not a definitive assertion about the capitalist origins of race
and racism but a claim that racial differentiation is intrinsic to productive processes of capitalist value creation and financial speculation, changing an idealized game of merit and chance into a stacked deck, as racially disparate fates manifest as devalued land, degraded labor, permanent indebtedness, and disposability. In short, in no period has racial domination not been woven into the management of capitalist society, and yet with important exceptions this issue has received little sustained, sympathetic attention from within the Marxist tradition. Exploitation and the constitution of an objective order of market dependency, not direct racial violence and domination, are thought to be continuously reproductive of capitalist relations of production. But if land, labor, and money are fictitious commodities that comprise foundations of capitalism, they also constitute what Patrick Wolfe has called the “elementary structures” of race. This insight complicates common tendencies within both liberal and Marxist intellectual traditions to think race in terms of ascriptive fixity and thus align racial differentiation with static notions of precapitalist particularity. Instead, it highlights the modern, uniquely fabricated quality of racial distinctions as a domain for the elaboration of a reserve of institutionalized coercion and related capacities for surplus extraction that persistently shadow normative processes of value formation within certain varieties of capitalist society.

Specialization in violence was integral to capitalism’s origins. Beckert names this “war capitalism”: a form of capitalist privateering backed and unimpeded by sovereign power and most fully realized in slavery, settler colonialism, and imperialism. Following Cedric Robinson, we might rename war capitalism racial capitalism, recognizing with Beckert that while it precedes industrialization it is also retained as an integral part of capitalism’s ongoing expansion. Returning to Marx, we can observe how the understanding of racial differentiation as a directly violent, and yet also typically flexible and fungible mode of ascription, at first might be said to retain important affinities with the conscription, criminalization, and disposability of poor, idle, and/or surplus labor: the historical process of forcibly divorcing “the producers from the means of production” that Marx posits as the precondition for the emergence of capitalism. In its overt violence, the creation of a pool of free, wage laborers that derives from a process of “bloody legislation against the expropriated,” turning feudal peasants into beggars and vagabonds “whipped, branded, and tortured by laws grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system,” might be said to closely parallel slavery in foregrounding direct coercion of producers of value. “The starting point of the development that gave rise both to the wage-laborer and the capitalist,” Marx writes, “was the enslavement of the worker. The advance made consisted in a change in the form of . . . servitude.”
Yet, as capitalism becomes what Marx calls “a never-ending circle,” the dynamic changes. Capital now requires that labor both appear and disappear. What Marx calls the “tendency of capital to simultaneously increase the laboring population as well as to reduce constantly its necessary part (constantly to posit a part of it as reserve)” comes to possess a more or less automatic, even natural character. “The disposable industrial reserve army,” he writes in another veiled reference to chattel slavery, “belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own costs.” While the initial “barrier [to forming a pool of wage labor] could only be swept away by violent means,” the mechanism for creating labor surplus going forward develops into what Marx terms an “economic law,” one that divides labor into “overwork” and “enforced idleness” as “a means of enriching individual capitalists.” This process internalizes competition and precarity among workers themselves, and in doing so “completes the despotism of capital.” Marx then details various forms taken by the “relative surplus population . . . the floating, the latent and the stagnant,” or lowest strata comprised of “vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes . . . the actual lumpenproletariat . . . who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation.” In these passages, Marx recognizes capitalism’s active production of the working class as contingent and heterogeneous. He also reserves some of his most scornful writing for these degraded, unwaged laborers—who are even more categorically marked for premature death and yet who nevertheless remain to haunt dialectical pretensions toward class simplification or unitary proletarian consciousness.

As Marx writes, mature capitalism exists when “the silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker.” At this point, “direct force, extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases.” In this moment, proximity of wage labor to the violent conditions that produced its dependency gives way to a split image of a working class divided into a group whose productive capacities have been harnessed by the industrial machine and those whom Marx describes as “sharply differentiated from the industrial proletariat . . . a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds.” This image of intra-working-class differentiation cuts against the grain of Marx’s radical recuperation of the abject term proletarian—as those left without reserves—as a figure of collective struggle. Yet, it also coincides with his periodic recourse to a version of progressive historicism wedded to capitalism’s civilizing potential that in turn sacrifices a proper understanding of the constitutive heterogeneity of forms of labor and its political meaning that he simultaneously uncovers. The direct application of state-sanctioned force and violence once required to create wage labor, moreover, does not disappear but is retained in hierarchy and competition between workers, in social requirements of policing unwaged labor that
has migrated to poverty and the informal economy, and in imperial and nationalist interpellations of the metropolitan working class.

The inattention to these political effects that frame but appear to no longer define relations of production has led to confusions between forms of domination and stages of development in which the unevenness of unpaid, disposable, and surplus labor is opposed to the orderly fluctuations of waged and reserved labor on a developmental axis defined by what Marx tellingly calls “the normal European level.” The exceptional cases in which direct force is used precisely include colonial spaces where slavery and other forms of coerced labor took root and where, Marx writes, “artificial means” including “police methods” are required “to set on the right road that law of supply and demand which works automatically everywhere else.” Marx’s fragmentary considerations on colonialism and slavery as matrices of “primitive accumulation” here highlight the value and limitation of his oeuvre for thinking about the ongoing development of racial categories—more precisely, the social reproduction of race as an ascriptive relationship anchored in ongoing violence, dominion, and dependency. Marx skewers the bourgeois fairy tale of a virtuous phase of so-called original accumulation achieved via the thrift and ingenuity of a “frugal elite” that condemned the unfortunate majority to a situation in which they would be forced (in Marx’s words) “to sell . . . their own skins.” In oft-quoted lines from Capital, volume 1, Marx emphasizes murderous origins of capitalism’s prehistory in a determinate history of Europe’s armed commercial expansion, colonialism, racial slavery, and genocide:

An enduring historical and theoretical challenge posed by this sketch revolves around how to interpret the temporal and conceptual cleavage between what is often viewed as a singular and inceptive moment—“the dawn of the era of capitalist production”—reliant upon force and violence and the era of capitalist accumulation proper that enshrines as its logic the “silent compulsion” of market discipline that dispenses with extra-economic coercion as a requirement. In this New World iteration, primitive accumulation is not yet capitalism for Marx; it is plunder. The relationship that it bears to the more fundamental process of divorcing the producer from the means of production remains unclear. Marx’s analysis in some ways blurs the distinction, for example, in his parallel refer-
ences to commerce in “skins.” Yet, New World primitive accumulation is an indictment of capitalism, not an explanation of its dynamics. Moreover, much like the nineteenth-century workers who spoke of wage slavery to distinguish themselves from, rather than align themselves with, racial slaves, Marx (who knew better than to do this) further suggests that a focus on the direct coercion of the producers not only misreads the source of capital accumulation but also deflects from the central challenge of anticapitalist politics by reinforcing the illusion of independence and freedom proffered by capitalism’s more “developed system of exchange”—that semblance of freedom, he writes, that “seduces the democrats.”

This passage affirms Marx’s tendency to characterize political inclusion as an illusion. Ironically, however, Marx’s effort to undermine what he calls the “rule of abstractions” depends upon the opposition between ascribed status and abstract labor. In the second epigraph to this essay, from the Grundrisse, Marx presents ascribed status as a kind of immobility or imprisonment, in contrast to wage labor, in which “individuals seem independent.” The specific terms of ascription—feudal, caste, estate, blood, and we might add slave—recapitulate oppositions that animate liberal, social contract theory more generally, counterposing plural forms of arbitrary power and forms of hierarchical, nonvoluntarist, nonvolitional social ordering with the universalization of an ostensibly modern, mobile, and dynamic social order based on contract and free exchange. Where most liberal thinkers retained education as an engine of meritocratic distinction and class mobility, Marx’s analysis moves in the opposite direction, emphasizing capitalism’s leveling indiff erence to any prior social condition, status, or standing. He does so, however, in an effort to unmask this “seeming” or “apparent” freedom from direct coercion, manifest hierarchy, and civic privation, as the grounds of a more extensive, increasingly universal domination under the terms of capitalist abstraction, which, he writes, comprises the “general form” and “theoretical expression of those material relations which are lord and master.”

Yet, Marx’s analysis, insofar as it adopts the standpoint of developed capitalism in England, can lead to an inattention, even indifference to how capital establishes new lines of social and historical genesis in which the ongoing differentiation between free labor and less than free labor, and the manifestation of that differentiation in racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies within laboring populations, is retained as an instrument of labor discipline, surplus appropriation, and even a measure of capitalism’s progressivism, in that it purports to render such distinctions anachronistic over the long run. It is significant in this regard that Marx contrasts not only the free worker and the slave but also the different relationships that the English yeomanry and former slaves have to capitalism. For the emancipated slave, Marx writes, “the capitalist relationship appears to be
an improvement in one’s position on the social scale. . . . It is otherwise when the independent peasant or artisan becomes a wage-laborer. What a gulf there is between the proud yeomanry of England . . . and the English agricultural laborer!” Ironically, although the yeomanry may have fallen further, they can recuperate pride in a different form. “The consciousness (or better: the idea) of free self-determination, of liberty, makes a much better worker of the [free worker] than the [slave], as does, the related feeling (sense) of responsibility.” “He learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.”27 This explains, as Marx notes elsewhere, why emancipated slaves reverted to self-provisioning, regarding “loafing (indulgence and idleness) as the real luxury good. . . . Wealth confronts direct forced labor not as capital, but rather as a relation of domination . . . which can never create general industriousness.”28

The differentiation between slavery and capitalism here effectively widens the gulf between slaves and workers. As Marx writes in an important statement, “Capital ceases to be capital without wage labor . . . as its general creative basis.”29 In this view, slavery’s inefficiencies, including inhibiting the possibility of increasing labor productivity through continuous reductions of socially necessary labor time, actively impeded the development of capitalism.30 What is curious is that Marx, who persistently theorizes capitalism in comparison with slavery to undermine what he calls “a liberalism, so full of consideration for ‘capital,’”31 seems to yield to his opponents’ intellectual tendencies in which capitalist social relations are framed through “a seductive dichotomy of ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labor, as if these categories were really opposites.”32 His remarks on affect, cognition, and habit formation of free workers and freed slaves reinforce distinctions between them, even problematically linking them to prior conditions of servitude. While the English workers’ loss of customary rights and subsequent proximity to the engines of value creation and to the dispositions formed therein places them in the vanguard of class struggle, both slave and ex-slave remain passive figures (indelibly linked together) and unable to connect to history’s forward movement.33

Marx of course notes: “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the republic. Labor in a white skin cannot emancipate itself, where in the black it is branded.”34 Yet, slave emancipation for Marx is but a prelude for a unified working-class struggle toward the eight-hour day. It is difficult to imagine Marx having any insight into ongoing social dynamics and movements that proceed directly from slavery. C. L. R. James observed of the Haitian slaves that “they were closer to a modern proletariat than any other group of workers in existence at that time” and capable of enacting a “thoroughly prepared and organized mass movement.”35 At the same time, thinking about the other side, Eric Williams, in
an argument that was heavily indebted to his mentor James, warned that the “outworn interests [of slavery] whose bankruptcy smells to heaven in historical perspective, exercise an obstructionist and disruptive effect” into the future, based upon the “powerful services it had previously rendered and the entrenchment previously gained.”

In part the limitation derives from the fact that Marx remains—even in his critical stance toward it—indebted to a conception of freedom defined as political opposition to arbitrary power, one that fails to fully interrogate what the grounding of freedom in chattel slavery and its violent modalities of household rule mean for the development of capitalist freedom going forward. Marx holds onto an ultimately problematic distinction between antediluvian slavery, which has what he terms a “patriarchal character,” and historical slavery “drawn into the world market dominated by the capitalist mode of production.” However, when he formulates an opposition between (an illusory) political freedom and (a metaphorical) economic slavery, Marx is thinking of the former, not the latter. In this way, the Marx-inspired critique of capitalism, like popular nineteenth-century critiques of wage slavery, can unwittingly become what Mary Nyquist terms “an important conductor of racialization . . . that severs or weakens the ‘free’ citizen’s affective ties with enslaved Africans [and others imagined to be lodged within dependent, privative, ascribed identities].”

Put differently, although Marx wants to overturn the idea that capitalism does away with servitude, when he adopts a Eurocentric historicism he participates in a broader discourse in which slavery comes to be discussed less in terms of its material relationship to capitalism and more as a kind of negative politicization, a form of insult and humiliation, a lack of political standing and social honor. Capitalist indifference and Marxist indifference in this sense collude ideologically in consolidating a nexus of work and citizenship as a technique of governance based upon distinct domains of political identity and hierarchies of concern: a division between the capitalist power and despotic power, the former a type of public power that deepens dependency (for the worker), and the latter, a mode of privation not afforded public standing.

Marx describes both direct private violence and organized state violence as the “midwife” of a capitalist mode of production, whose development, maturity, and superior productivity are predicated on an ability to dispense with cruder means. Capitalism is still a violent system, but its violence is immanent within a developmentally superior labor relation that no longer requires direct applications of coercive force. Indeed, direct coercion not only is a fetter on productivity gains—the representation of the absence of direct coercion, in both legal and ideological terms, is also one of the main ideological bulwarks of capitalist domination. Given the sexual and gendered cut of slavery and colonization, the metaphor of the...
midwife as someone whose reproductive labor is essential but historically dispensable retains a certain resonance for framing the relationship of slavery and capitalism. The Marxist view of capitalism as a progressive historical force and a superior mode of production and social reproduction tends to either remove or freeze our vision of the gendered racial violence indispensable to its birth as something that is essentially static, nonhistorical, and nonreproductive—a historical event that ended in time and whose remains or traces in the present are vestigial, marginal, or anachronistic. Capitalism may “come into the world dripping from head to toe in blood,” as Marx writes, but it manages to clean itself up, at least in certain spaces and places. The true novelty of its forward march, particularly when conceived on the narrow terrain of the free labor contract, depends upon an abstract, autonomous, and immanent reproductive capacity.

It would be a mistake to end the analysis here, however. Marx as already observed is decidedly hesitant, even ambivalent, on this issue. The English economist Malachy Postlethwayt, whom Marx read, was perhaps the first to describe the “African trade” as a “prop and support” of British free trade. Marx takes up this figure in various forms, for example, when he writes that “the veiled slavery of the wageworkers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.” Elsewhere Marx recognizes without illusions that the “business of slavery is conducted by capitalists,” that slavery only “appears as an anomaly opposite the bourgeois system itself,” and that under the spur of the cotton trade “the civilized horrors of overwork [have been] grafted onto the barbaric horrors of slavery and serfdom.” Indeed, one of his clearest statements on the issue was penned two decades before Capital and evinces what might be considered a more clear-sighted abolitionism that sets its sights on capitalism and slavery together as they were conjoined within a single, global space:

Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have not cotton; without cotton you have not modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance.

By these lights we might begin by rewriting Marx’s axiomatic statement, “Capital ceases to be capital without wage labor,” in the following way: Capital ceases to be capital without the ongoing differentiation of free labor and slavery, waged labor and unpaid labor. This differentiation provides the indispensable material and ideological support, prop, or pedestal on which capitalism’s development depended and on which it continues to depend. The categorical separation of freedom and slavery operates in the interests
of capital. It is only by retaining an understanding of their imbrication and coconstitution that we attain a critical perspective adequate to oppose it.

These moments—and they are only moments, since Marx never delivers an analysis of slavery as an “economic category of the greatest importance”—are well worth holding on to. Here Marx evinces a refusal of the historicist separation between capitalism and slavery, one that sharpens the argument that capitalist development represents a more general and generalizing form of domination and pulls our thinking toward rather than away from the legacy of slave capitalism and capitalist slavery, and toward enduring articulations of race and capital, the problematic that Robinson has termed “racial capitalism.” Temporal cleavage gives way to simultaneity, a rejection of “logical formula” that would separate coexisting, mutually supportive elements into sequential time. Only later does Marx characterize this in terms that open themselves up to teleological interpretation, describing “the incompleteness” of the “development of capitalist production” that joins to “modern evils,” “inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of archaic and outmoded modes of production with their accompanying train of anachronistic social and political relations.” But the marking of certain relations as passive or anachronistic remains problematic. What if this incompleteness is a permanent feature of capitalism? Moreover, what happens when those supposedly passive or archaic modalities most closely linked to direct coercion not only are retained within the labor process but also shape the form of the state?

North American slavery was also a mode of social reproduction with an immanent logic: it was capable of birthing itself. The vitality of this system required it to outgrow the externalities of the Atlantic slave trade and derived from its own directly reproductive capacity built upon violent control over the wombs of slave women, along with expanding settlement and murderous depopulation of indigenous land. Nor did slavery simply wither away; it required a war of cataclysmic proportions and mass death on an unimaginable scale to bring it formally to an end. What followed for the majority of freed blacks was an era no less marked by direct violence and coercion of labor under varieties of penal enforcement. Freeing slaves enlarged both the instrumental and popular political ambit of racism as a tool of labor discipline (divide and rule), a means of introducing new forms of labor coercion (so-called coolie labor), and a weapon of class struggle (the wages of whiteness) and, of course, empire. It also inaugurated an era of state and private violence that directly seized upon black household formation, sexuality, and embodiment as a means to preserve and reproduce a racial-capitalist political economy with far-reaching, global implications. As Du Bois memorably wrote in his magisterial Black Reconstruction in America, which adopted a Marxist idiom, the “echo of that philanthropy which had abolished the slave trade, was beginning a
new industrial slavery of black and brown and yellow workers in Africa and Asia.”

Indeed, if the system built upon racialized chattel slavery is understood as a “variant of capitalism,” might we not make the stronger claim that the configuration of capitalism that develops from it develops racism as a dimension of its general form? Insofar as (this variety of) capitalism reproduces, as part of its logic, divisions between (re)productive humanity and disposable humanity, might we not further recognize how this very division is mediated by the shifting productions of race as a logic of depreciation linked to (a) proletarianization as a condition of “wageless life”—the norm of capitalism insofar as it produces radical market dependency and surplus labor—and (b) the regular application of force and violence within those parts of the social that subsequently have no part? Finally, to the extent to which direct compulsion and organized violence are retained within capitalist social formations, might its conceptual import lie not as much in its direct relationship/nonrelationship to the exploitation of labor and the extraction of surplus value (let alone its alleged anachronistic qualities) as in its indispensability and contribution to the development of cutting-edge technique within the governance of capitalist social relations—not only the defense of private property but also the active management of spatiotemporal zones of insecurity and existential threat that negate the idea that the value form successfully encompasses an entire way of life?

Within the Marxist tradition, Rosa Luxemburg comes closest to this view when she notes that “the accumulation of capital, seen as a historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further down to the present day.” It is precisely the failure of capitalism’s universalization, particularly when viewed at a global scale, and its ongoing dependence upon “non-capitalist strata and social organization . . . existing side by side,” she writes, that produce “peculiar combinations between the modern wage system and primitive authority” and enable “far more ruthless measures than could be tolerated under purely capitalist social conditions,” citing “the first genuinely capitalist branch of production, the English cotton industry.” What still needs jettisoning is the lingering reference to a pure capitalism and primitive authority that reinstall the very oppositions that she otherwise challenges. Echoing Marx’s comment that “war developed earlier than peace . . . in the interior of bourgeois society,” and anticipating Michel Foucault: “A battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently,” Luxemburg points to the institutionalization of coercion within capitalism, specifically militarization, not only in the retention of the option of primitive accumulation but also as the guarantor of capitalist discipline and disposability at the shifting borders of its circulatory movement.
Civil society, as both Foucault and Marx in different ways argue, is the exemplary conceptual object of capitalism as a realm of (economic) freedom that fundamentally modifies the terms of (political) authority. If Marx is concerned to demystify this process by suggesting the actual subordination of new forms of sovereign political status to a more profound and encompassing economic tyranny, Foucault at times emphasizes the real limitation market freedom introduces into the political life of the state. “The condition of governing well,” he writes, “is that freedom, or certain forms of freedom are really respected.” The idea of a totalizing police power gives way to a form of police focused upon the prevention of disorders and disasters and the management of their probabilities. At the same time, Marx and even Foucault in some sense turn away from and exceptionalize the phenomenon that at different points preoccupies both of them: the bloody, annihilationist violence that haunts the modern episteme. In an echo of Marx’s account of the diminution of overt force, Foucault, for example, aligns Nazi genocide with the retention of an otherwise atavistic sovereign right to kill as an “eruption of racism” within a governmental field normatively defined by imperatives of population management and biopolitical growth. But like Marx, he fails to account for the retention of this always waning, quasi-hallucinatory genocidal force that never entirely vanishes.

It is not, moreover, only spectacular violence but also the repetitive, incremental, often slow or concealed violence of appropriation that needs to be considered here. If socially necessary labor time constitutes the meaning of value for capital, as Jason W. Moore writes, such value is embedded in a web of life that capital insistently appropriates as the necessary prop, wedge, or pedestal for the exploitation of formally free wage labor. Marxist theory that assigns the primary novelty of capitalism to economic exploitation and the production of surplus value that structurally separates economic compulsion from direct domination fails to recognize what may be an even greater novelty of capitalism: the consistent extraeconomic processes of appropriation by which capital is able to “identify, secure, and channel unpaid work outside the commodity system into the circuit of capital.” As Marxist feminists have long noted, “the appropriation of accumulated unpaid work in human form,” including the labors of biological and social reproduction delivered the world over by women, provides the real historical conditions for “socially necessary labour-time.” A narrow sphere of productive relations, in this view, depends upon a more expansive sphere of appropriation in which cheap human and extrahuman nature are taken up by commodity production.

Embodied in the figures of the slave, the migrant worker, the household worker, the chronically unemployed, and the like, appropriation encompasses zones of both privatized and publicly sanctioned coercion and
ethicopolitical devaluation that are inseparable from capitalist processes of valorization. Thus, rather than opposing notions of absolute sovereignty and its power of life over death with a biopolitically, productive materialist history, we might instead recognize how the two have been perdurably braided together (at least in part) through the conquest/commodification of black bodies (as well as in the conquest/commodification of indigenous lands) that for Marx comprises the moment of so-called primitive accumulation, extending this to the ongoing unpaid work of women the world over, accumulated unpaid work represented by labor migration, and war capitalism’s differentiation between the internally ordered, rule-bound spaces of production and market exchange and exceptional zones of armed appropriation. The latter are domains not only for enacting plunder, that is, primitive accumulation (or accumulation by dispossession), but also for developing cutting-edge procedures, logics of calculation, circulation, abstraction, and infrastructure—the slaver’s management of human cargo, the camp, the prison, the forward military base—innovations that can proceed insofar as they are unfettered by legally protected human beings advancing new prejudices, built upon the old.53

With respect to slavery, we might recognize how the supposed diminution of extraeconomic coercion that defines the emergence of the economic and the political as analytically distinct domains has as its counterpart the retention and elaboration of logics of racialization, defined first via war slavery doctrine (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and others) and later in terms of ideas of race war, at the site of capitalism’s recurrent crises and (never completed) universalization. Actual slavery, which Locke describes as the continuation of a precivil state of war that develops into a relationship between a lawful conqueror and captive, is retained for thinking the conquest of freedom as the end of political slavery and arbitrary rule within Euro-American colonial contexts. Here, the slaveholder’s power over life and death is retained by the sovereign political subject. Meanwhile, racialization as a normative logic “generates heritable liberties along with heritable slavery,” as servility and incapacity (conceived as either inherent or derived from the condition of enslavement) are reserved and elaborated as explanations for subjects whose very existence counts not only as an aggression against freedom but also against life itself and who therefore can be permanently sequestered, governed without rights, or killed with impunity.54

As a final illustration (and by way of conclusion), I turn briefly to the archives of black radicalism, via consideration of the passages from Frederick Douglass quoted at the outset. In the first passage, published three years before the Communist Manifesto, Douglass marks what I would suggest is a new production of race at the moment of a transition from one labor regime to another—slavery to wage labor—in which black entry into
an order of abstract equivalence defined by the wage relation is understood by whites as a threat to their own wage-earning capacity, one that is in turn narrated as a loss of country—or sovereign capacity—which in turn calls forth the fantasy of a war of extermination against the offending party. This moment in Douglass’s text is interesting for the ways in which it illuminates race making as a social, political, and affective process that in the final instance is conceived as an irreducibly warlike relationship. Yes, black and white, slave and free already exist as distinctions. But, at first Douglass tells us, the presence of the “free colored” poses no special problem. What initiates the shift “all at once”?

On first glance we might read the passage as confirming conventional wisdom of theorists of racially segmented labor markets. However, emphasizing that “things seemed to be going very well,” and noting white fears of potential black monopolization of the trade as mere “allegation,” Douglass is in fact doing more than making a claim about antiblack racism as a historically given condition. What is it about the mere presence of a “black carpenter” that means total loss of livelihood? Why is the sense of threat so readily amplified and transferred to the thresholds of political identity and national subjectivity (“niggers taking the country”)? Finally, how does the affect (fear, anger) get translated into a genocidal impulse (“we all ought to be killed”)? Put simply, how does the race-labor conjunction become a race-war conjunction? My suspicion is that the figure of race war, far from being an afterthought, in fact controls and mediates the entire sequence that Douglass describes. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of Douglass’s Narrative is the ways in which he consistently describes slavery as something other than the theft of black labor, emphasizing instead its violent, totalizing claims on black life as a thoroughly militarized and policed social relation.

In explaining this sequence of events, Douglass intentionally highlights the double threat of wagelessness and political degradation that the considered presence of the “black carpenter” evokes. In turn, he depicts the production of race (in this case, whiteness) as a process of binding juridical status and despotic power—(keeping the) “country,” “putting on airs,” and arrogating expansive, extracivil rights to kill. He defines all of this, moreover, in terms of an instance of transition from slavery to capitalism. The development of race as a form of generic whiteness in this view is revealed as a specific relationship to blackness in its relationship to capital—one that is based upon a deferral of the haunting specter of wageless life evoked by the prior association of blacks with slavery, as well as by actual, ongoing conditions of market dependency. Indeed, it is worth recalling in this context Du Bois’s famous description of whiteness in Black Reconstruction in America as “a public and psychological wage.” The association of whiteness with wages through the monopolization of...
fields of employment has been widely discussed. Less fully examined is how the transfer of whiteness to the threshold of nationality actively links freedom with the management of public authority, specific mechanisms of violence, and an operational notion of (racial) nemesis.

The passage from Douglass’s *Notebooks* quoted above offers final amplification of my (admittedly provisional) efforts here to think the relationship between race and capital again. It is tempting on initial reading to interpret Douglass’s lines against the claims developed here. After all, taking on the garb of the common laborer, Douglass seems precisely to affirm as directly emancipatory the movement from household slavery to wage labor. On closer inspection, however, Douglass is actually making a more specific claim about what the capitalist wage relation looks and feels like from the standpoint of slavery. The feeling of joy (“the emotion which swelled my heart”) produced by recognition of self-possession (“my hands were my own”) and the possibility of accumulating “more of the precious coin” are in this view entirely contingent upon the condition of enslavement (“one must have been in some sense a slave”). Here, we might wonder about the ways in which Douglass and Marx converge, for in both the critical sense of the deep violence of proletarianization and market dependency (within the ongoing transitions to capitalism) is audibly retained most directly in reference to slavery (and for Douglass within black life that emerges from it). Indeed, the fact that it was Anna Murray, a free black woman, whose savings from domestic labor paid for the disguise that Douglass used when he escaped slavery deepens further the webs of dependency upon which any so-called freedom depends. As Du Bois would go on to argue, the “real modern labor problem” lies closer to the condition of racial dispossession than to the prospects of normative, wage-earning stability. Capitalist freedoms and their enjoyment (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) in turn require us continuously to “put on airs” and to cultivate a generous rage against the prospects of a bare life.

Atlantic slavery emerged as the cornerstone of capitalism’s articulation of exploitation, appropriation, and dispossession during the long sixteenth century, but it also bequeathed something that lasted—an enduring cheapness of black life. The production of race as a form of devalued collectivity has depended upon managing valuations and devaluations of black social and biological reproduction in the interests of capital accumulation and its social reproduction. Medical experimentation, crime statistics, debt peonage, labor market manipulation, rent harvesting, infrastructural exclusion, and financial speculation—the racial differentiation thought extrinsic to capitalism’s postslavery itinerary has been both directly productive of value and integral to the technical development of capitalism on its alleged frontiers, where new specializations in violence
can be field-tested free from ethical judgment, setting off new rounds in which peoples separated from land and resources can be consumed within the web of capital.

Marx recognizes that capital is built not on its contradiction with exploited labor but in a contradictory relationship to life itself. Capital accumulation spurs population increase and also voraciously uses up and depletes living labor. The crisis that must be constantly managed by capitalism at a societal level is the ongoing violent dislocation of these two processes. Racial marking is a response to a crisis of and resistance to the value form that takes the form of police and military solutions, that is, directly coercive interventions. It spurs the fabrication of moral, temporal, and spatial sequestration that become part of the ideological and institutional framework of crisis management through which the production of growth and death can be viewed less as a contradiction in the present than as a necessary dimension of historical progress itself.\(^{55}\) Racism’s toxicity, in this view, is a product of capitalist abstraction and a material event. It is as much our inheritance as is the environmental degradation that has developed from capitalism’s appropriation of cheap nature and that now widens the bandwidth of morbidity for everyone and everything in its path. The relationship of capitalism and slavery is in this way far-reaching. By exposing the proximity of violence and economy and the heterogeneity of historical time, it also reveals “the broken time of politics and strategy.”\(^{56}\) Rather than a disorientation, it is a starting point for any reconstruction.

Notes

Anupama Rao encouraged me to write the original version of this essay. I thank her and the participants in the Caste and Race Workshop at Columbia University in October 2013 for their engagement with this work. I especially want to thank Harry Harootunian, Tavia Nyong’o, Neferti Tadiar, and Jennifer L. Morgan for their critical and generative comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

1. For an original and exemplary statement of this viewpoint, see Brenner, “Agrarian Structure and Economic Development.” Brenner sharpens the polemical stakes of this argument, taking on various modes of “dependency” and “world-systems theory,” faulted for “displac[ing] class relations from the center of economic development” and for failing to recognize “the productivity of labor as the essence and key of [capitalist] economic development.” See Brenner, “Origins of Capitalist Development,” 91.

2. Following Brenner, Ellen Meiksins Wood writes: “The wealth amassed from [slavery and] colonial exploitation may have contributed substantially to further development, even if it was not the necessary precondition for the origin of capitalism. . . . If wealth from the colonies and the slave trade contributed to Britain’s industrial revolution, it was because the British economy had already for a long time been structured by capitalist property relations” (Origin of Capitalism, 149).
3. As much as any other contemporary thinker, Stephanie Smallwood strives to link logics of slavery as social death and as a novel form of commodification: “The Atlantic market for slaves changed what it meant to be a socially, politically or economically marginalized person... Captivity... was not a temporary status... not [a situation] of extreme alienation within the community, but rather of absolute exclusion from any community” and the fashioning of “bodies animated only by others’ calculated investment in their physical capacity” (Saltwater Slavery, 30, 35).

4. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 92, 114. Also see Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. Important contributors to the contemporary resurgence of this argument include, among many others, Smallwood, Walter Johnson, Edward Baptist, and Julia Ott. The key progenitor of this line of inquiry was Eric Williams, who argued that slavery profits were central to industrial capitalist takeoff. This controversial thesis (which bears the traces of stagist thinking) was subject to death by a thousand historiographical cuts in the decades following the publication of Williams’s book. What was arguably most disturbing about Williams’s argument was his more fundamental challenge to those who emphasized slavery’s vestigial character in order to moralize and legitimate subsequent capitalist development—in effect, to free capitalism from a debt to slavery. Writing in a period in which US-led international capitalism sought to disencumber itself from the racial and imperial matrix in which it had developed, Williams provided an unsettling dose of skepticism: “This does not invalidate the... arguments for democracy, for freedom now or for freedom after the war. But mutatis mutandis, the arguments have a familiar ring,” and “we have to guard not only against the old prejudices but also against the new which are being constantly created” (Capitalism and Slavery, 210, 212). Frank Tannenbaum exemplified the kind of orthodoxy that Williams unsettled during the period of his writing. “The Negro race has been given an additional large share of the face of the globe for its own. It received this territory as a kind of unplanned gift,” Tannenbaum writes. “It is in its own nature, no different than the process which has occurred as a result of the allurement which led millions of Americans to labor in American mines, fields, and factories... The result has been moral. It has proved a good thing for the Negroes in the long run. They have achieved a status both spiritually and materially, in the new home to which they were brought as chattels” (“Note,” 248–49).


6. For a powerful contemporary theory that develops this view, see Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life.

7. Marx, Capital, 925, 381, 225. Here are the respective quotations in full: “Whilst the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England in the United States it gave the impulse for the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact the veiled slavery of the wage laborers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New world as its pedestal” (925). “Capital therefore takes no account of the health and the length of the life of the worker, unless society forces it to do so. Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, is this: Should that pain trouble us, since it increases our profit (pleasure)?” (381). “If labor-power can be supplied from foreign preserves... the duration of [the worker’s] life becomes a matter of less moment than its productiveness while it lasts. ... It is accordingly a maxim of slave management in slave importing countries, that the most effective economy is that which takes out of the human chattel in the shortest space of time the utmost of exertion that it is capable of putting forth” (225).

8. Wilderson, “Gramsci’s Black Marx,” 230. For a related argument more in
keeping with the spirit of my approach in this essay, see Johnson, “Pedestal and the Veil.”

9. Morgan, “Archives and Histories of Racial Capitalism.” Also see Morgan, “Partus Sequitur Ventrem.”

10. Douglass, “Reception Speech at Finsbury Chapel,” 308. “We have in the United States slave-breeding states . . . where men, women and children are reared for the market, just as horses, sheep and swine are raised for the market. Slave-rearing is there looked upon as a legitimate trade; the law sanctions it, public opinion upholds it, the church does not condemn it. It goes on it all its bloody horrors, sustained by the auctioneers block.”

11. What Frank Wilderson has termed gratuitous violence retained an instrumental value as exemplary violence in the face of much feared resistance and revolt. More recently, Edward Baptist has also made a compelling case for the relationship between bodily torture and surplus extraction under slavery (The Half That Has Never Been Told).

12. The notion of accumulation by dispossession is a contemporary reframing of Marx’s so-called primitive accumulation. See Hart, “Denaturalizing Dispossession.” Also see Perleman, Invention of Capitalism.

13. By describing land, labor, and money as “fictitious commodities,” Karl Polanyi emphasizes the imposition of the logic of the self-regulating market and universal commodification as the defining features of capitalism. Further, he emphasizes how processes of commodification broadly encompass not only the domain of labor and its social and biological reproduction but also the ecological matrix of life itself, as well as the mediums and modes of exchange that constitute social horizons. The subjection of all three domains to the market mechanism threatens the very conditions of social existence, stripping human beings of “the protective covering of cultural institutions,” “defiling neighborhoods and landscapes,” and subjecting purchasing power to disastrous “shortages and surfeits of money” (Great Transformation, 76). This formulation challenges both liberal and Marxist tendencies to construct the economy as an analytically autonomous domain. At its best, the notion of fictitious commodification draws our attention to the ongoing, state-enforced, noncontractual, and dominative bases of capital accumulation, as well as to dynamics of social protection or resistance that often draw on nonmarket norms of land, labor, and money (including potentially reactionary ones). “Laissez-faire was planned, planning was not,” Polanyi writes, and “the stark utopia” of the free market found an answer to its deepening crisis, the fascist response. See also Block, “Karl Polanyi”; and Fraser, “Can Society Be Commodities All the Way Down?”


15. Kazanjian, Colonizing Trick.

16. The literature on varieties of capitalism not only emphasizes contingent, differing institutional arrangements compatible with actually existing capitalism but also more strongly argues that there is no capitalist mode of production as such, only “configurations” or “forms of capitalism” “compatible with a variety of forms of labor-exploitation” (Banaji, Theory as History, 11).

17. Marx, Capital, 875.

18. Marx, Grundrisse, 400.


20. There may be a way that the slave and lumpenproletariat resemble each other by, as it were, absolutely falling outside a relationship of capitalist exploitation. This insight is of course a spur to thinkers like Frantz Fanon and George Jackson,
though this line of inquiry is not pursued here. I am indebted to Tavia Nyong’o for this insight. Also see Stallybrass, “Marx and Heterogeneity,” 81.


23. Marx, *Capital*, 937. Marx writes: “In the old civilized countries the worker, although free, is by a law of nature dependent on the capitalist; in the colonies this dependence must be created by artificial means” (937). (He is not referring to slavery here, but he could be.) The problem of the colonies is that there is too much freedom for workers to opt out and to become “independent landowners, if not competitors with their former masters in the labour market” (936). Marx then adds: “We are not concerned here with the condition of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World” (940).

24. Ibid., 873, 915.


26. Ibid.


29. Ibid., 270.

30. See Post, *American Road to Capitalism*, for a contemporary exponent of this view.


33. Marx, *Capital*, 382. Just as the worker’s idea and feeling of freedom have important material effects, so does the transformation of freedom into a kind of status distinction. “Capital . . . takes no account of the health and length of the life of the worker,” Marx writes, “unless society forces it to do so.” This is of course a reference to the English class struggle, mostly one-sided in Marx’s view, in which the worker may achieve a normal working day but is “compelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his active life, his very capacity for labor in return for the price of his customary means of subsistence, to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage.”

34. Ibid., 414.


36. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, 211.


42. Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*, 125. Gopal Balakrishnan describes the (early) Marx of this period as an “abolitionist” in a set of brilliant essays (“Abolitionist—I,” “Abolitionist—II”). As he writes, “Only later would Marx come to see a contradiction between free wage labor and slavery. Now he assumed that American slavery was an integral part of the world system of bourgeois society. . . . The Marx of this period was a ruthless abolitionist” (“Abolitionist—I,” 92).

43. Robinson, *Black Marxism*.


47. It is important to note that the term *proletariat* in Marx literally means “those without reserves.” As Michael Denning writes, it is not a synonym for wage labor “but for dispossession, expropriation and radical dependence on the market” (“Wageless Life,” 81).


51. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 260. While Foucault develops an idea of race war as integral to modern statecraft, his account is idiosyncratic and equivocating. When it comes to examining Nazi violence, he appears to validate an exceptionalism marked by temporal relegation. “A society which generalized biopower in an absolute sense . . . has also generalized the sovereign right to kill. The two mechanisms—the classic, archaic mechanism that gave the State the right of life and death over its citizens, and the new mechanism organized around discipline and regulation . . . of biopower—coincide exactly . . . We can therefore say this: The Nazi state makes the field of life it manages, protects, guarantees and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own people.” Discussing the “final solution,” Foucault writes, “Nazism alone took the play between the sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of biopower to this paroxysmal point. But this play is in fact inscribed in the workings of all states. In all modern states, in all capitalist States? Perhaps not.”


54. This discussion is heavily indebted to Nyquist, *Arbitrary Rule*, esp. chap. 10 and epilogue.

55. Cooper, *Life as Surplus*, 60.


References


